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DIVERSITY: THE RED HERRING OF
EQUAL PROTECTION
SHARON ELIZABETH RUSH*
I want to thank Ann Shalleck and the Washington College of Law
community for inviting me to participate in their Centennial Cele-
bration. I am honored to be a member of this panel and have this
chance to explore equal protection analysis with you. Listening to
Donna Lendoff and Debbie Brake talk about the VMcase1 reminded
me of a small triumph I had at VMI a few years ago. I was visiting
Washington & Lee Law School for a few days as part of the ABA site
evaluation team. Each morning, before the team gathered for break-
fast, I went for my morning run. The first day, I ran toward VMI and
noticed that the gates to its track were open. I am unable to resist an
open track and this one was no exception. I did not see any "no
trespassing" signs and so I decided to run a lap. As I was running, I
felt strange because I knew that women are excluded from VMI and I
wondered if I would be welcome to use the track, or if the public
exclusion of women was so well known that signs indicating this were
unnecessary. I remember thinking it was just a matter of time before
the cadets woke up and found me on the track and shot me. That
was probably the fastest quarter mile I've ever ran, and it felt great!
For all I know, VMI may have let women use the track and I may
not have been an unwelcome intruder that morning. But even if that
is true, I still felt like I had "beaten" VMI's male-only policy if only for
a few minutes and even if in such an insignificant way. Given the
public animosity that VMI shows toward women, I ran under the
presumption that I would not be welcome, even though that may not
have been the case. Violating rules and customs in a male-dominated
world that discriminates against women is part of most women's every
day lives. Many women believe they have to keep their triumphs over
male-dominated rules to themselves for fear their gains will be taken
* Copyright 1996. All rights reserved. Professor, University of Florida, College of Law. Carter
Andersen's research assistance and careful reading of this essay are deeply appreciated.
1. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding that an all male institution
violates equal protection).
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away if the men find out what they are up to. The silent rebellion
against male norms has been going on for a long time.
Fortunately, more women are openly testing some of those rules
and bringing public attention to the inequalities women face. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's pioneering efforts to secure women's equal
protection2 paved the way for young women like Shannon Faulkner
to openly challenge a state military college's male-only policy. Ms.
Faulkner wanted more than a secret, personal triumph; she aspired
to be a graduate of the Citadel, which had an exclusionary policy
similar to VMI's. She wanted to permanently dismantle the Citadel's
and VMI's male-only policies and expose them as violations of
women's equal protection. Her personal triumph at defeating such
policies would potentially empower other women to go about their
day-to-day activities without fear of being "shot down" by discrimina-
tory rules and practices.
When this conference was held in April, 1996, we wondered how
the VMI case would be decided. Virginia offered three primary
justifications for its policy. It asserted that the policy promoted diver-
sity among educational opportunities in Virginia, and also that its
"adversative method of training provided educational benefits that
could not be made available, unmodified, to women," and that al-
terations to accommodate women would necessarily have been so
'drastic' as to 'destroy' VMI's program." One of VMI's primary mis-
sions was to turn young men into "citizen-soldiers."4
I was particularly intrigued by Virginia's argument that the policy is
constitutional because it promotes diversity. I wondered if this stated
purpose would pass intermediate scrutiny and whether the Court
would find that the policy was substantially related to promoting
diversity. We also speculated whether the Court would apply strict
scrutiny, requiring Virginia to demonstrate that the exclusion of
women is necessary to achieve its compelling interest in having di-
verse educational opportunities for its male citizens. Regardless of
the level of review the VMI Court might apply in the case, I thought
how ironic it would be if the diversity rationale allowed VMI to stay
2. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 Sup.
CT. REV. 1 (1975) (analyzing developments in gender equality from 1973-1974 Terms); See also
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, SeualEquaity Under the Fourteenth and Eqtal Rights Amendments, 1958 WASH.
U. L.Q. 161 (1979) (discussing women's equality under the 14th, 15th and Equal Rights Amend.
ments).
3. 116 S. Ct at 2279.
4. Id at 2270 (explaining that as an adversative, hierarchical model featuring "[pihysical
rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of
behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values").
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sex-segregated, but was an insufficient reason to let the U.C. Davis
Medical School racially integrate in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke.' The Bakke Court invalidated the medical school's admissions
policy because it set aside 16 of 100 seats for racial minorities, for
among other reasons, to promote diversity.'
Since the conference, the Court held against VMI in an opinion
written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by six other justices, including
Chief Justice Rehnquist who concurred Justice Scalia is the lone
dissent,' andJustice Thomas recused himself.9 Highlighting language
from Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan," a 1982 decision in
which the Court invalidated an all-female nursing school program,
Justice Ginsburg held that VMI had shown no "exceedingly persua-
sive justification" for its male-only policy." She called this standard of
review "skeptical scrutiny.'' 2  Notwithstanding this new language, it
seems that the level of scrutiny for sex-based classifications is still
intermediate.' For example, in applying skeptical scrutiny, Justice
Ginsburg referred to the more common understanding of interme-
diate scrutiny and held that Virginia failed to show that the "male-
only" admissions policy is substantially related to an important gov-
ernmental interest.4 In the opinion, Justice Ginsburg reviewed the
Court's treatment of sex discrimination cases, relying on precedent
and established law to evaluate VMI's exclusively male- only policy.
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that the race-based admissions program was illegal).
6. I& at 274-75. See infra notes 282-84 & 290 and accompanying text.
7. 116 S. Ct. at 2287-91 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). See infra note 242 for a discussion of
his concurrence.
8. 116 S. Ct. at 2291-309 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
9. He recused himself because his son is a cadet at VMI. Linda Greenhouse, High Court To
Hear Case About V.M.I., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,1995, atA21.
10. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 718 (1982) [hereinafter Hogan]
(holding that an all women's institution violates equal protection).
11. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287.
12. Id. at 2274 ("[Tloday's skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities
based on sex responds to volumes of history.").
13. ChiefJustice Rehnquist suggests in his concurrence that this new language adds uncer-
tainty to the law and he thinks the Court should have avoided it. 116 S. Ct. at 2287-91 (Rehnquist,
CJ., concurring). Justice Scalia states that the Court's use of skeptical scrutiny is another way of
using strict scrutiny, which he states is the wrong standard to use. Id. at 2291-309 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
14. "[The State] must show 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives.'" United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2264, 2271 (quoting
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150
(1980)).
15. I& at 2275 (reviewing cases from 1971 to present which paved the way for the Vt
decision).
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
She cited with approval the Court's position stating that sex classifica-
tions are not exactly analogous to race and ethnicity classifications,
that are subject to strict scrutiny. 6 Moreover, she stated that laws
classifying on the basis of sex are not constitutionally proscribed
because there are differences between men and women; differences
that can be accommodated not to disparage men's or women's equal
protection rights, but rather to promote equality between the sexes."
Although the Court rejected both of VMI's arguments, VMI's use
of the diversity justification, which persuaded the District Court,8 and
received considerable attention from the Supreme Court, emphasizes
how terribly misunderstood diversity is. 9 Specifically, the emphasis
on diversity detracts from the profound value at stake in admissions
and hiring policies that aim to increase the number of people of
color and white women in state programs." Commonly known as
affirmative action, these policies deal with integration, and govern-
ment officials originally designed and implemented these policies to
increase the representation of minority groups in state programs."
Affirmative action is about integrating state programs on the basis
of sex and race. It demonstrates that the diversity rationale is over-
valued by both minority and majority groups in equal protection
analysis. Although diversity is an attractive goal, it is the wrong issue
to focus on in cases like VMiP and even Bakke." A fuller understand-
ing of diversity obviates the inquiry into the level of review that
should be applied in evaluating the constitutionality of government
hiring and admissions policies whose justifications rest partially on
16. Id. (refusing to equate "gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on
race or national origin...").
17. Id at 2276 (stating that "[tjhe heightened review standard our precedent establishes does
not make sex a proscribed classification. ... Physical differences between men and women,
however, are enduring" and "remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the mem-
bers of either sex .... ).
18. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated 976 F.2d 890
(4th Cir. 1992), reu'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
19. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996), (citing 976 F.2d 890,899 (4thCir. 1992))
(stating that VMI failed to establish how a program that benefits only males furthered the Virginia
state "diversity" policy).
20. See generally, Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Understanding Affirmative Action: One
Feminist's Perspective, in An Ethical Education: Community and Morality in the Multicultural
University 195, 203 (M.N.S. Sellers ed., 1994) (noting that the hiring of "poor white men, or
the white male critic" through hardship or ideological diversity, respectively frustrates the
purpose of affirmative action. Therefore, facial diversity must be included in the context of
affirmative action.).
21. See generally, Rush, supra note 20, at 195-232. See also United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. at 195-232.
22. 116 S. CL 2264 (1996).
23. 438 US. 265 (1978).
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diversity goals."4 State officials who implement affirmative action
policies can rely on the value of integration to achieve their goals.
Racial integration is a compelling state interest and integration on
the basis of sex is an "exceedingly persuasive justification," if not also
compelling."
The exclusively-male policy at issue in WVM was not an affirmative
action policy. Quite the contrary; the policy jeopardized the value of
integration. State officials who invoke diversity to justify policies that
exclude minority groups" from state programs must explain why
involuntary segregation, masquerading as diversity, is worthier of
constitutional protection than is integration. When diversity com-
petes with integration, it should be insufficient to pass even the most
minimum level of scrutiny.
Naturally, this view depends on what I mean by the concepts of in-
tegration and diversity. Given their complexities, I am not able to
define them conclusively in this essay,28 but I nevertheless want to
offer a minimum understanding of them - an understanding I believe
is well-accepted. Previously, I suggested that integration means the
hiring and admitting people of color and white women into pre-
dominantly white, male-state institutions, programs, and jobs. This
understanding of integration is well-settled. Racial integration be-
came a primary focus of equal protection when the NAACP worked
to desegregate the schools during Jim Crow.' The Supreme Court
held in Brown v. Board of EducationP that de jure racial segregation
creates a racial caste system where Blacks are denied equal citizen-
ship.' The Brown Court held that racial integration is essential for
24. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) (stating that
attainment of a diverse student body is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of
higher education but is one of many in a range of factors).
25. &- id at 314 (remarking that the interest of racial diversity is compelling in the context of
a university's admissions program).
26. "Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an
'exciusively persuasivejustification' for that action." United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274
(1996) (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
27. Programs that exclude majority groups raise different concerns. See text supra at pp. 52-
56.
28. For example, perhaps integrating on the basis of sexual orientation, religion, class, or
handicap should be the focus of affirmative action policies. It is difficult to dispute that including
people in these categories in state programs also promotes equality. I explore this in the context
of sexual orientation in, Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies - Identity and "Passing":.
Race and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARv. BLAcKLrrERJ. 65 (1997).
29. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-50 (1987); RICHARD KLUGER, SmiPLEJUsnCE: TIm HISrORY OF BROWN v. BOARD
OFEDUCATIONAND BLACKAMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOREQUALIY (1975).
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Id. at 493 (stating that segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race
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racial equality."
Similarly, it is well-settled in American jurisprudence that state
programs should be integrated on the basis of sex. In this area,
Congress took the leading role and ensured equal protection for
women through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act." The Supreme
Court started invalidating sex-based laws in the early 1970s, and
Justice Ginsburg is very deliberate about detailing the historical
discrimination against women in the VMT opinion.' Significantly,
laws that discriminate on the basis of sex are subject to heightened
scrutiny because the Court acknowledges that sex discrimination is
somewhat similar to race discrimination, an anathema to a demo-
cratic society." Justice Ginsburg uses the analogy between race and
sex discrimination throughout the VM! opinion, emphasizing that
the importance of equal citizenship for women is similar to that for
Blacks."6
Thus, integration on the basis of sex seems to be a common, well-
accepted value. This is not to say that the government can never
treat men and women differently. For example, in Rotsker v. Gold-
berg, 7 the Court held that only men have to register for the draft."
Congress defers to military personnel with respect to rules limiting
certain military combat positions to men." Neither the Court nor
Congress has taken the position, however, that it is constitutional to
although physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors maybe equal, deprive black children equal
educational opportunities).
32. Id. at 493-94 ("[To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."). See generally Sharon
Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1 (1997).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§2000(e) -17 (1964).
34. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2278-79 (1996) (indicating that historically
Virginia's discrimination against women has been deliberate).
35. Id. at 2275 (suggesting that "supposed 'inherent differences'" should not be accepted as
grounds for gender classifications because they are no longer accepted for race or national origin
classifications).
36. Id. at 2277.
37. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
38. Id. (holding that women who were excluded from combat service by statute or military
policy and men were not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft).
39. For a background on Congress' role in the issue of women in the military, see Pamela
R.Jones, Note, Women in the Crossfire: Should the Court Allow It?, 78 CoRNELL L. REV. 252 (1993).
See, e.g., Joel Greenberg, Ruling Expands Women's Roles in the Israeli Militay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
1996 at A5 (stating that "American women may fly combat aircraft in the Air Force and Navy.
But they still may not serve in the Army's infantry, armored and helicopter units slated for
direct ground combat," while also noting that other countries like Israel are less protective of
women's roles in the military.).
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"categorically"' exclude women from serving in the military, or from
participating in other state programs. As Justice Ginsburg reaffirms
in the VM! case, "the Court has repeatedly recognized that neither
federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protec-
tion principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply
because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal opportunity
to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on
their individual talents and capacities."41 Just as race is an insufficient
reason to categorically discriminate against minorities, so too is sex
an insufficient reason to categorically discriminate against women.
Clearly, integration on the basis of race and sex is an accepted and
important (compelling) government interest in equal protection
analysis.
Finally, I want to emphasize that integration does not mean that
people of color and women should assimilate into White, male cul-
ture. Reinforcing hegemony by requiring a minority or historically
subordinated group to assimilate is unacceptable. True equality for
people of color and women in an integrated environment means that
they share equal power - "full citizenship stature" - with all others.
The differences that people of color and women bring when they
integrate an environment must be valued and respected to achieve
the equality that integration offers.
Turning to the concept of diversity, several years ago, I wrote an
article entitled, "Understanding Diversity,"' in which I tried to define
diversity. It was not easy then, and it is made easier now only because
I realize how integration and diversity overlap. In my article, I identi-
fied three different kinds of diversity: facial, hardship, and
ideological.' Briefly, facial diversity applies to government policies
whose goals are to increase the number of people of color and white
women in their programs." Hardship diversity would target for
inclusion "people whose lives are more difficult, and who, as groups,
generally do not share in the power structure because of various
attributes or characteristics (other than being a man of color or a
40. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2282. See also id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
41. Id. at 2275.
42. See generaly Sharon Elizabeth Rush, UnderstandingDiversiy, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1990).
43. Id at 2 (proposing that more possibilities and names exist for the three possibilities
chosen, however "these three terms highlight many of the misunderstandings that can arise absent
a common definition").
44. Id. (defining a facially diverse group as one that includes members who are not all of
one race and gender).
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woman) they have that deviate from normative standards."' In this
group, I included "poor people, working-class people, non-
Christians, handicapped persons, homosexuals, [and] the elderly...
"' Finally, ideological diversity is achieved when an institution has
among its members persons who share different views.47 In the con-
text of law school faculty, for example, it would mean having
traditional scholars, critical race theorists, feminist theorists, law and
economic theorists, among others on the faculty.' My article ex-
plores the complexities surrounding diversity, highlighting that none
of these definitions is intended to be essentialist; a person can diver-
sify an environment in all three ways, as well as others. 9
I posited in my article that we, as a society, should strive to achieve
all three kinds of diversity. Laws preventing discrimination on the
basis of hardship characteristics are necessary and consistent with
equality principles.' Moreover, ideological diversity is consistent with
the First Amendment values we hold dear. As we struggle to define
integration and diversity with respect to groups other than people of
color and white women, we must remain committed to achieving
facial diversity in state institutions, programs, and jobs. Otherwise, it
will be all too easy to promote white, male hegemony by hiring white
men who fit hardship or ideological diversity goals." "[Mlaleness
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id.
47. See generally Rush, supra note 42, at 3-4.
48. See Sharon E. Rush, UnderstandingAffirmnative Action One Feminist "s Perspective in AN ETHICAL
EDUCATION: COMMUNrlY AND MORALITY IN THE MULTICULTURAL UNIVERsTY 195, 202 (M.N.S.
Sellers ed. 1994).
49. Rush, supra note 42, at 3-4.
50. Fortunately, most groups who satisfy hardship diversity are somewhat protected by law.
Title VII protects people from government discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Some groups also receive protection from other laws: the First Amendment
guarantees religious freedom and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§12101, provides protection for disabled persons. Older people are protected by age discrimi-
nation laws, and the elderly and poor persons are given some government subsidies to help
them combat income deficiencies. Noticeably absent from the group of people who satisfy
hardship diversity and who receive some kind of government protection are gays and lesbians.
But for the occasional local ordinance providing them equal protection, there are no laws that
protect them from government discrimination. In fact, many governments try to pass laws that
allow discrimination based on sexual orientation. The HouseJudiciary Committee approved a
bill that would absolve states from recognizing same-sex marriages that were performed in
other states. Eric Schmitt, Panel Passes Bill to Let States Refuse to Recognize Gay Marriages, N.Y.
TIMEsJune 13, 1996 atA15. Significantly, the Supreme Court held in Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996), that states cannot pass legislation or constitutional amendments prohibiting
anti-discrimination laws based on sexual orientation because such laws are motivated by
"animus," Id. at 1628, and deny gays and lesbians equal protection. Perhaps the Romer
decision will be a turning point for the Gay Civil Rights Movement.
51. See Rush, supra note 42, at 12 (citing as an example Galludet University for hearing
impaired, hired non-hearing impaired women as President, only to force her resignation and hire
a hearing-impaired white male instead).
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and whiteness alone empower... in ways that our present power
structure disempowers men of color and women." 2 How much
clearer my understanding of diversity would have been if I had rec-
ognized that by facial diversity I meant integration.
Integration on the basis of race and sex achieves diversity. The
goal of integration has become lost in the diversity debate, however,
because diversity can also be achieved by admitting or hiring appli-
cants who have other "preferred" characteristics not predominant
among people in the existing state programs or jobs. For example,
the Bakke Court defined diversity to include factors in addition to
race, such as geographical residency of the applicants, and personal
traits, such as musical or athletic talent.' The Bakke Court held that
the U.C. Davis Medical School should follow Harvard's lead and look
at many diversifying characteristics in choosing its class.' In defining
diversity, the Bakke Court was much more creative than I; according
to it, diversity means virtually any differences among people.
If integration is seen as only one aspect of diversity (facial diver-
sity), it is clear that diversity is always promoted when integration is
achieved. In the context of education, an integrated class comprised
of both sexes and people of different colors is a more diverse class
than is a class comprised of only men or only whites. Conversely,
integration on the basis of sex and race is not always achieved when
hardship or ideological or other types of diversity are promoted. An
educational institution that admits the white applicant from Minne-
sota and the white piano player into a predominantly white medical
school promotes diversity but otherwise leaves the school racially
segregated.
A critical question becomes: what kind of diversity does equal pro-
tection protect? At the core of equal protection analysis is the
concept of protecting equal citizenship.' Justice Ginsburg in the
52. Rush, supra note 42, at 11 (footnote omitted).
53. " [T]he race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favorjust as geographic origin
or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other candidates' cases. A farm boy from Idaho
can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer... . In Harvard
college admissions the Committee has not set target-quotas for the number of blacks, or of
musicians, football players, physicists or Californians to be admitted in a given year." Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-18 (1978) (citing Appendix to Brief for Colum-
bia University, Harvard University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as
amicus curia) (comparing the U.C. Davis admissions policy that set-aside 16 of 100 seats for
minority applicants to Harvard admissions policy).
54. Id. at 317 (stating "[the Harvard Program] treats each applicant as an individual in the
admissions process.... The applicant's] qualifications would [be] weighed fairly, and he would
have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
55. Id.
56. &e KENNETH L. KARSr, BELONGING TO AMEPICA EQUAL CmzENsHnu AND THE
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VMI opinion provides a simple and powerful definition of citizen-
ship, referred to above, but worth repeating here. She states that
"full citizenship stature" means having "equal opportunity to aspire,
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on [an indi-
vidual's] talents and capacities."" Thus, the equal protection clause
should protect those kinds of diversity that promote equal citizen-
ship.' Promoting facial diversity is consistent with the purpose of
equal protection; it provides equal opportunities for people of color
and white women to participate in society as equal citizens.
Just as it is clear that equal protection guarantees people of color
and white women equal citizenship stature,59 it is also clear that equal
protection does not guarantee the superior citizenship stature of
historically privileged groups. This interpretation of equal protec-
tion would undermine the accepted goal of integration and render
meaningless the concept of diversity. Simultaneously, a meaningless
definition of diversity would become the focus of equal protection,
which, in turn, would maintain the status quo. Men would continue
to be valued more than women, and whites would continue to be
valued more than people of color. In short, an interpretation of
equal protection that valued majority group privileged citizenship
stature over the citizenship rights of women and people of color
would basically render the equal protection clause superfluous.
Moreover, some kinds of diversity have nothing to do with promot-
ing equal citizenship and are beyond the scope of equal protection.
The equal protection clause has never protected everyone from every
kind of discrimination. In fact, the nature of law is to discriminate
and the challenge for governments is to justify why some laws privi-
lege some people and not others. For example, an applicant to a
state military school who plays the piano and is rejected from the
school would not be able to successfully challenge the school's deci-
sion as a denial of equal protection because only non-piano players
were admitted to the school. This would be so even though the
entering class will be less diverse because of the admissions commit-
tee's decision.
In contrast, if the musician is a woman trying to get into VMI, her
CONSTITUTION 105-124 (1989).
57. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.
58. Id. at 2276.
59. See iU; at 2275; see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (illustrating the first time the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of a woman claiming denial of equal protection by state laws);
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (recognizing women's equal protection rights under
Louisiana law); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 US. 7 (1975) (invalidating a Utah child support law with
separate support ages for boys and girls).
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rejection raises equal protection concerns because she is a woman,
not because she plays the piano. The diversity she brings as a piano
player is irrelevant to the equal protection claim, but the diversity she
brings as a woman is at the core of equal protection analysis: she
integrates the school. To discriminate against her on the basis of her
sex is to deny her equal citizenship.
Understanding that diversity in the equal protection context
should be synonymous with integration, it is dear that the Bakke
Court defined diversity much too broadly.' Had the Court focused
on integration, it is difficult to dispute that integrating state schools
on the basis of race is a compelling governmental interest. An af-
firmative action policy designed to racially integrate the medical
school was the only realistic and practical way to accomplish this well-
accepted, constitutional goal. This understanding of diversity sup-
ports the constitutionality of the medical school's plan. If the Bakke
Court had adhered to the Brown Court's principle of racial equality
in public education, the medical school's affirmative action policy
would have been upheld. The U.C. Davis Medical school plan could
then have been publicly held out as a policy consistent with our
democratic value and commitment to achieving racial equality.
Integrating a public school on the basis of race does not interfere
with achieving diversity; integrating public schools enhances the goal
of achieving diversity.
The Court was correct to invalidate the exclusively-male policy in
VA. However, the decision fails to clarify the meaning of diversity in
equal protection analysis and instead actually adds to the existing
confusion. Significantly, VMI lost on the diversity justification only
because the state could not prove that the purpose behind the policy
was to promote diversity.6' Quoting the Court, 'Virginia has not
shown that VMI was established, or has been maintained, with a view
to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational
opportunities within the State."' This holding on the diversity justifi-
cation suggests an all-male public school might be considered diverse
for equal protection purposes if it were established for the purpose of
promoting diversity. An all-male public school like VMI fails to
promote the values of integration and equal citizenship which are at
60. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 483 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (stating "the diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which race or ethnic origin is but a single
though important element."). See also Marty B. Lorenzo, Race-Consious Diversity Admissions
Programs: Furtheinga CompellingState Interest, 2 MICH.J. RACE & L 361 (1977).
61. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2273.
62. Id. at 2277.
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the core of equal protection.' A state's decision to create such a
program for the purpose of offering a diverse educational experience
to its male citizens should not allow the state to escape its obligation
to provide equal protection to its female citizens.
The VM[ Court's rejection of Virginia's second proffered justifica-
tion for its policy, to produce "citizen-soldiers,"" indirectly supports
this understanding of the role of diversity in an equal protection
analysis. For example, the Court held "[sitate actors controlling
gates to opportunity ... may not exclude qualified individuals based
on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females.""'n The Court explicitly acknowledges the equal citizenship
stature of men and women stating, "[s]urely [VMI's goal of produc-
ing citizen-soldiers] is great enough to accommodate women, who
today count as citizens in our American democracy equal in stature
to men. ' While this language supports the conclusion that VMI
should be integrated, the Court does not use the term "integration"
to support its holding that the exclusively-male policy violates
women's equal protection.
The Court's choice of words, "may not exclude women,"'67 is an
oblique way of saying the school should be integrated on the basis of
sex. The Court could have taken a more aggressive approach and
asked whether the Constitution required VMI to integrate, consistent
with equal protection. This focus places the male-only policy in
historical context, exposing it as an age-old method of denying
women equality. This focus also reinforces our commitment to
eradicating discriminatory policies.
The VMf Court explicitly left open the question whether "separate
but equal ' state schools for college men and women would be con-
63. Interestingly, the majority opinion does not mention diversity as a possible rationale for
maintaining the sex-segregated university. Justice Scalia's dissent, however, argues that Mississippi
University for Women offers "an element of diversity that has characterized American education
and enriched much of American life." United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2308 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Hogan, 458 US. at 735 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)). I think the Hogan
Court was correct to avoid the diversity trap, but it nevertheless reached the wrong conclusion.
Similarly, the Hogan dissent was correct to uphold the constitutionality of the school, but should
not have placed its justification on diversity. A voluntarily sex- (or race) segregated school for
women (or people of color) is constitutional because it promotes the equal citizenship of women
(or people of color) in a male-(or white) dominated world. &e Hogan, 458 U.S. at 735 (PowelI,J.,
dissenting).
64. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
65. Id. at 2280 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725).
66. Id at 2282.
67. IK.
68. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (establishing the separate-but-equal rule for
applying the Fourteenth Amendments equal protection guarantee).
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stitutional.69 ChiefJustice Rehnquist's concurring opinion posits that
VMI could have avoided a constitutional attack if Virginia had cre-
ated a separate school for women of equal caliber to VMI.1 Justice
Scalia believes Virginia's goal of diversity was achieved and beyond
constitutional infirmity because the state also had four women's
colleges in addition to VMI.
Establishing "separate but equal" schools on the basis of sex is a
complex issue and I want to touch on it only briefly to demonstrate
how the diversity rationale does not belong in this debate either. In
my opinion, male-only segregation like that in VMI can never be
equal for reasons similar to the reasons that white-only segregation
like that in Brown can never be equal. White-only segregation de-
nies people of color their rights to equal citizenship.5 This is the
very foundation of Brown and should apply just as forcefully in the
context of sex discrimination. Male-only state schools create a hier-
archy where men's citizenship stature is valued more than women's
citizenship rights. A defense of diversity should not save them under
the equal protection clause.
Closely related and somewhat ironically but nevertheless under-
standably, state programs permitting voluntary segregation by
minority groups like women and people of color should be constitu-
tional, but, again, not because they promote diversity. Such
programs should be constitutional because they empower minority
groups who can then compete as equal citizens with their majority
counterparts and they do not threaten the equal citizenship rights of
privileged groups. In this way, the VMT Court's reliance on Hogan
was misplaced because the Court in Hogan was also diverted from the
critical issue of deciding whether Mississippi's all-female nursing
program was constitutional.
In Hogan, one male plaintiff claimed the University's female-only
admissions policy was unconstitutional. Mississippi offered him
other available nursing programs, but he wanted to attend the all-
female nursing school because it was convenient for him.' Missis-
sippi asserted the program was part of an affirmative action policy to
69. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720 n.1).
70. Id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
71. Id. at 2299 n.3 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
72. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 483.
73. Id. at 494 (finding that segregation deprives people of equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
74. Mississippi Univ. forWomen v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
75. I at 724 n.8 (explaining that in order to attend a co-educational nursing program, he
would have to drive a "considerable distance" to reach school).
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remedy some of the past discrimination women suffered in Missis-
sippi's educational system.' The Hogan Court rejected this argument,
finding no evidence that the actual purpose of the exclusively-female
policy was to remedy past discrimination because nursing programs
had always been available to women in Mississippi." Notice how the
Hogan Court's confusion about differences between majority-only
and minority-only exclusive policies and the role of diversity in equal
protection resurfaces in VM. For example, just as the Hogan Court
invalidated the all-female nursing program because it was not created
with the purpose of helping women become nurses because Missis-
sippi had always made nursing programs available to women, the VMT
Court also rejected Virginia's argument that the Military Institute was
created to promote diversity, when it clearly was not." If the Hogan
Court had seen the actual purpose of the Women's University was to
promote the equal citizenship of women (regardless of what they
were studying or that they might be able to study nursing at sex-
integrated schools and regardless that nursing is a predominantly
female field), then perhaps the VMJ Court would have focused on
Hogan to expose the actual purpose of VMI's policy, which was to
promote the superior citizenship stature of men at the expense of
denying equal citizenship rights of women." This focus obviates the
need to discuss the irrelevant issue of diversity.
Thus, diversity simply has nothing to do with either case, as the Ho-
gan Court understood because it did not discuss the issue. On the
other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell dissented in
Hogan because they believed the all-female school offered "an ele-
ment of diversity that has characterized American education and
enriched much of American life. ' ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dissent
in Hogan carried over to his concurrence in VMI, thus augmenting
the confusion over the proper role of diversity in equal protection."
Recall that he suggests that VMI would have promoted diversity if
only Virginia had created an all-female school of equal caliber to
VMI.' Thus, in both cases, ChiefJustice Rehnquist reached the right
result; he would have upheld the all-female nursing school and he
76. Id. at 727 (noting that "[t]he State's primary justification for maintaining the single-sex
admissions policy... is that it compensates for discrimination against women").
77. I. at 729 (stating that women had received the vast majority of nursing degrees in
Mississippi prior to the opening of the Mississippi University School of Nursing).
78. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279.
79. Id.
80. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 735 (Powell,J., dissenting).
81. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2290.
82. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
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invalidated VMI's male-only policy. However, neither he nor the
majority of justices in VM understand that the proper justification
for upholding the constitutionality of an all-female program is be-
cause it promotes the equal citizenship of women without
simultaneously damaging men's equal citizenship rights. Conversely,
the all-male policy in VMI promotes men's superior citizenship rights
and denies equal citizenship rights to women.
Similarly, people of color should be allowed state support for vol-
untarilyS3 created racially-segregated schools as a way of empowering
themselves in a white-dominated world. Unfortunately, efforts to
help inner-city children of color by creating public schools for their
exclusive use are being stymied because of the confusion around the
differences between majority-only and minority-only exclusive poli-
cies." The programs are dramatically different and it is disingenuous
for white society to challenge voluntarily created minority-only pro-
grams as a denial of their equal protection given the profound racial
inequality in our society where white is valued over black, brown and
other skin colors."
A day may come, hopefully will come, when women and people of
color will be equal to men and whites, respectively, making the use of
minority-only exclusive policies unconstitutional. But just as we are
not yet a colorblind society, neither are we a society unmindful of the
privileged status of men. To pretend otherwise is to deny reality and
reinforce the status quo where white is valued over other skin colors
and men are valued over women.
In summary, then, couching the constitutional inquiry in cases like
Bakke and VMT in the context of integration also puts in perspective
the diversity justification. Affirmative action policies are constitu-
tional because they integrate state programs. Integration on the
basis of race and sex also diversifies state programs. In contrast,
attempts to justify sex-segregation in state programs by arguing the
policy promotes diversity is irrelevant to an equal protection analysis.
Voluntarily created all-female schools should be constitutional be-
cause they promote the equal citizenship of women without
83. I use the word "voluntarily" with reservation because often the racism is so pervasive in
oursociety that people of color seeksolace in isolation from white society to regain their identities.
In this way, social isolation is not truly voluntary. See Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of SEgregation:
Links Between ResidentialSegreation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REv. 795, 808 (1996) ("[T]he
issue really is whether such a 'choice' can be called voluntary if it results from a need to escape
racism and racists.").
84. SeeJacques Steinberg, Plan for Harlem Girls School Faces Concern Over Sex Bias, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 1996 at Al (stating that "studies often show that girls, particularly from poor neighbor-
hoods, learn better when boys are not in the classroom").
85. Seegenerally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
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damaging the equal citizenship stature of men. This is true for vol-
untarily race-segregated programs for minorities, as well. Similarly,
the diversity justification offered by Virginia merely highlights the
inequality perpetuated by the exclusively-male policy. Equal protec-
tion does not protect the privileged citizenship stature of men at the
expense of the equal citizenship rights of women. Moreover, the
implicit suggestion that a male-only policy could pass constitutional
muster if adopted with the actual purpose of promoting diversity
undermines that part of the opinion that strikes down Virginia's
second justification that the policy is necessary to create "citizen-
soldiers" out of the male cadets. VMI's policy is unconstitutional
because it denies women equal citizenship. This rationale alone is
sufficient to invalidate the policy and would also be sufficient to
invalidate a similar white-only policy in a state program like VMI. In
short, cases like Bakke and VMI are about integration, not diversity.
Diversity is the red herring of equal protection analysis.
